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THE SANCTION OF A DUTY
GEORGE W. GOBLE
What is a legal duty? Terry says, "A person who is com-
manded or forbidden by law to do an act is under a legal duty
to do or not to do it." I It is defined by others in similar terms.2
But when 'is a person commanded? What constitutes a com-
mand? What penalty for doing an act must the law impose to
warrant the statement that the act is forbidden? Is it conven-
ient or desirable to say that one is under a duty to perform
every act or forbearance for the non-performance of which the
law imposes upon him a penalty or disadvantage?
When we think of a legal duty we think of a threat. The
state says to one, "If you do a certain act I will cause you harm."
This is a threatening attitude. It is the placing of one in a
position of peril. Duty has reference to that situation in which
one finds himself when, if he does or forbears to do an act, pun-
ishment is imminent. Imminency of harm for doing or for-
bearing to do an act seems to be the gist of the relation.2 Yet
2 TERRY, LEADING PRINCIPLES OF ANGLo-AMiERICAN LAw (1884) 84.
2 "When the law recognizes an act as a duty, it commonly enforces the
petformance of it, or punishes the disregard of it." SALMOND, JURSrRU-
DENCE (7th ed. 1924) 236.
"When the state may compel B to carry out, either by act or forbearance,
the wishes of A, we may indifferently say that A has a legal right or
that B is under a legal duty." HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE
(13th ed. 1924) 88.
"A duty is relative, or answers to a right where the sovereign commands
that the acts shall be done or forborne towards a determinate party, other
than the obliged." AUSTIN, JURISPRUDENCE (3d. id. 1869) 413.
"It (duty) is the legal relation of a person, B, who is commanded by
society to act or to forbear for the benefit of another person, A, either
immediately or in the future, and who will be penalized by society for
disobedience." Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology (1919) 29 YALM
LAW JOURNAL 163, 167.
a A penalty may be a sufficient sanction for a duty even though the
penalty is not regarded as detrimental by the one under the duty. A $25.
judgment would be but slightly onerous against a millionaire, or one who
is "judgment proof" may take the sheriff's execution very lightly. A
tramp may even prefer a cot and three meals a day in jail to sore feet and
a straw pile on the road.
In employment contracts it has been suggested that since suit by an
employer against a defaulting employee is usually impracticable there
is no duty owed by the employee to the employer. This seems unsound
since there is always the possibility that a judgment may prove valuable
by the employee's acquisition of property. See Co1mImoNs, LEGAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF CAPITALISm (1924) 285, 286.
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does logic or convenience dictate that the imminency of any harm
or detriment for doing or failing to do an act shall constitute
a duty? If all legal detriments do not sanction legal duties, what
is the test for determining which do and which do not? The
following are examples of questions that arise. If one, who is
the heir of his grandmother displeases her, causing her to will
her money to another, has he violated a duty? If a holder of
a note fails to notify an endorser of the maker's default so that
he loses his right against such endorser, has he violated a duty
to the endorser? If an applicant for insurance misrepresents the
state of his health, or fraudulently conceals a material fact and
his contract is avoided because of this, has he violated a duty?
Is one under a duty to retreat when assaulted? Before placing
a criminal charge against another is one under a duty to make
a full and fair statement of the case to an attorney? Is a re-
tiring partner under a duty to give notice of his withdrawal to
those with whom the firm has dealt? In the case of a breach
of contract is the injured party under a duty to mitigate dam-
ages? If a witness has been asked a question the answer to
which might incriminate him, is he under a duty to claim im-
munity? Is one, acting in good faith, under a duty not to sue
another on an unfounded claim? Is one under a duty not to be
negligent if no harm results, or not to be contributorily negli-
gent? Is a parent under a civil duty to his minor child for sup-
port? Is a creditor under a duty to his surety not to e.x-tend
time to the principal debtor? Is a depositor under a duty to
notify his bank of returned forged checks?
In order to find a satisfactory answer to these questions and
others that could be suggested, it seems desirable to give con-
sideration to the different kinds and degrees of punishment
recognized by law, and to attempt to ascertain the most conven-
ient and useful terminology for describing the threat of these
varying forms of punishment.
Suppose X is the father of two sons, D and C. As a reward
for their respective services, the father has given C three apples
and D one apple. To discourage D from harming C, because of
the unequal distribution of the apples X may threaten D in any
one of five ways. He may say to D, "If you hara C,
1. "I will not take one of C's apples from him and give it to
you.
2. "I will not permit you to take one of C's apples by your
own act.
3. "I will not permit you to receive one of C's apples by his
own act.
4. "I will permit C to take your apple from you, by his own
act.
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5. "I will take your apple from you and give it to C."'
With X corresponding to the state, C and D to members of
society in that state, and the apples to groups of beneficial legal
relations, these five types of punishment are roughly analogous
to the different forms of punishment that may be imposed by the
law. Examination of these modes of punishment reveals that the
first three are different forms recognized by the law for prevent-
ing one from acquiring benefits, and the last two are different
forms for depriving one of benefits. Fundamentally, it is believed,
all forms of punishment possible under the law may be resolved
into one or the other of these two classes.
To deprive one of the use, possession or ownership of tangible
objects or to prevent him from acquiring the use, possession or
ownership of them is to punish him. To put one in jail or to
prevent his getting out, to put a hot iron to one's hand or to re-
fuse to take it off is to punish him. But all benefits and detri-
ments under the law may be resolved into beneficial and detri-
mental legal relations. One's ownership of a tangible object
consists of certain rights, privileges, powers and immunities with
respect to such object. So when it is said that the law may pun-
ish by taking from him, or preventing his acquiring something
beneficial, the reference is to beneficial, desirable or advantageous
legal relations. He is punished by being deprived of or pre-
vented from acquiring rights, privileges, powers and immunities.
Such relations, singly or in groups constitute the apple of the
law. Deprivation of the rights, privileges, powers and immuni-
ties that constitute one's legal life is the heaviest penalty the
law can inflict. Of slightly less value is the privilege of free
and unrestrained locomotion. Of still less value are legal rela-
tions with respect to contracts and property. But deprivation or
prevention of acquisition of any of these constitutes the law's
method of punishment.5
With X as the state, C and D as members of society, and sub-
stituting beneficial legal relations for apples, X's five threats of
4 D might be required to forfeit an apple to X but, under our theory of
criminal law, it would be held for the benefit of C and other members of
society. This is therefore a part of (5).
5 Another form of expressing the two fundamental modes of punishment
is to say that one may be punished by causing him either to acquire or
retain detrimental legal relations. But if one is deprived of or prevented
from acquiring beneficial legal relations, he necessarily acquires or retains
the contraries of such relations, which are detrimental. If one is deprived
of certain rights, privileges, powers and immunities with respect to a
certain tangible object he will acquire certain no-rights, duties, disabilities
and liabilities. To say that he loses a right is to say that he acquires a
no-right, and to say that he is prevented from acquiring a power is to say
that he retains a disability. The statement of one is the statement of the
other.
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punishing D may be now restated. X may threaten that if D
acts in a certain manner toward C one of the following five forms
of punishment will follow:
1. X will refuse to intercede as against C to enable D to ac-
quire beneficial legal relations.
2. X will refuse to recognize D's act as automatically acquir-
ing for him beneficial legal relations.
3. X will refuse to recognize C's act, or another event, as
automatically creating in D beneficial legal relations.
4. X will recognize C's act, or another event, as automatically
depriving D of beneficial legal relations.
5. X will intercede for C to deprive D of beneficial legal re-
lations.
A study of the above five penalties discloses that in (1) the
state threatens what Holfeld called a no-right, in (2) it threat-
ens a disability, in (3) a detrimental immunity," in (4) a detri-
mental liability, and in (5), in response to the demand of C, an
executive or judicial order, judgment, decree or similar act ad-
verse to D. Another way of stating the same thing is to say
that the state threatens the following deprivations; in (1) a
right, in (2) a power, in (3) a beneficial liability, in (4) a bene-
ficial immunity, and in (5) a privilege. It has been said above
that in order for a duty to exist in a person, there must be a
threat or imminency of the incurrence of a legal disadvantage
in such person. The state must say to him "If you do or fail to
do this act I will cause you harm." The term "duty" does not
describe the relation that exists after the act has been done for
which the law metes out punishment, but it describes the rela-
tion e:isting prior to such act.7 Any person has the power to
6See HOHFLD, FUNDAi ENTAL LEGAL CONCEpnoNS (1923) 35. The
first reaction to a study of Hohfeld's tables is that there are but four
detrimental legal relations, and therefore but four types of penalties
recognized by law, but further study reveals that a liability may be either
detrimental or beneficial, depending upon what one is liable to receive,
something beneficial or something detrimental. Therefore those liabilities
only are detrimental that have reference to detrimental legal relations.
Since liability may be either detrimental or beneficial, its negative, immunity,
may likewise be either beneficial or detrimental. If one is immune from
the creation in himself of something detrimental, immunity is an advantage
and is valuable, but if one is immune from the receipt from another of
legal advantages he has something detrimental. Therefore immunity from
the creation by another's act of beneficial relations must be added as a
fifth type of punishment.
In the above scheme of penalties Hothfeld's views are departed from to
the extent that impersonal events are recognized as having powers and
disabilities. This explains the clause "or another event" used in penalties
(3) and (4).
7 Putting a man under a primary duty is not ordinarily a mode of punish-
ment for doing an act, but putting him under a secondary duty, no-right,
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do an act resulting in an immediate legal disadvantage to him-
self. Such legal disadvantage must necessarily consist of a detri-
mental legal relation, and such relations are limited in number.
According to Hohfeld's system of analysis, which is believed to be
sound, there are but five. Whether there is a legal duty
presently existing in D not to do a certain act should depend upon
the character of the detrimental relation that D creates in him-
self by doing such act. It might be said without any offense to
logic that if any detrimental legal relation is created in him by
his doing an act, he is under a duty not to do such act. But
usage of the term "duty" does not justify such a broad connota-
tion. It would lead to absurd results. For example, since if D
abandons his property he loses those beneficial relations with
respect to it that constitute ownership, he would be under a
duty not to abandon it. Likewise he would be under a duty not
to give his property to another. A limitation of the scope of
duty therefore seems desirable. To what extent should it be
limited? An answer to this question requires a further study
of the five penalties set forth above.8
I. Supposing that the threat of X is that if D does or forbears
to do an act, X will refuse to intercede as against C to enable D
to acquire a beneficial legal relation, is D under a duty to for-
bear or do such act? If D has done an act resulting in the loss
of his right, an agent of the state will refuse, upon D's demand,
to proceed against C or his property. This is a punishment to
D for doing such act, because it prevents him from acquiring
desired legal relations with respect to C's property or person.
If D should sue C on a claim barred by the statute of limitations
the court's judgment would be for C, and the sheriff would re-
fuse to levy upon and sell C's property to satisfy D. If D should
ask for an injunction restraining C from committing a continu-
ing trespass upon D's land, and the court should refuse to grant
it because D had given C permission, the loss of D's right that C
should not trespass would be the penalty imposed upon D for
liability or disability may frequently be such. It is thus seen that no-right,
liability and disability as modes of punishment must be classified with a
secondary duty and not with a primary duty. It is not useful to say,
because a person will come under a primary duty if he does a certain act,
that he is therefore under a duty not to do such act.
Throughout this article, "duty" is used in the sense of "primary duty"
unless otherwise indicated.
s It does not follow from the above that all duties, no-rights, disabilities,
liabilities and detrimental immunities that one may have or acquire are
penalties. One has many of each from birth and he acquires many through
no act of his own. It is only when they are imposed as a result of certain
conduct on his part that they can be spoken of as penalties. All members
of society are burdened with thousands of primary duties, no-rights, dis-
abilities and liabilities in rem, but the state has not imposed them as
penalties for misconduct.
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giving C permission. If a fire insurance policy provides that
it shall become "void" if there is a change in "title, ownership
or possession" of the property, and D violates such provision, it
is usually held that the clause is "self executing" and that, there-
fore, in case of loss by fire, D has no right that the policy shall
be paid.u In each of these cases D has done an act resulting in
the loss to himself of a right. In so doing has he violated a duty?
In an unusually stimulating and valuable article,' Professor
Arthur L. Corbin has come to the conclusion that under some
circumstances, the threat of a deprivation of a right should
establish the existence of a duty. He does not give a generalized
statement of his test for determining what is and what is not a
legal duty, but from an examination of the examples given it
might be concluded that he regards as a duty not only those
relations sanctioned by remedial duties but, to some extent, those
sanctioned by no-rights and liabilities. The writer believes that
there are several objections to this view and an attempt will
be made to present them. A consideration of the several illustra-
tions of duties used in the article referred to will make possible
a clearer presentation of the points of criticism. It is said by
him that a creditor is under a legal duty to the surety not to
give an extension of time to the principal debtor, because if he
does so he suffers the penalty of losing his conditional right to
payment from the surety." The existence of this penalty makes
the act of giving time a breach of duty. If C, the creditor, is
under a duty to S, the surety, then S has a right against C that C
shall not extend the principal debtor's time. But can it be said
in any customary sense that S has such a right? Professor
Corbin says in another part of his article that "a 'right' exists
when its possessor has the aid of some organized governmental
society in controlling the conduct of another person." 12 But can
S in any sense control the conduct of C? Neither by his own
act nor by aid of an agent of the state has S a power, conditional
or unconditional, to impose a penalty upon C. S is helpless. The
whole situation is in the control of C. He has the legal power
to extinguish his own right against S by doing the act of extend-
ing time to the principal debtor. As between S and C, S occupies
the undesirable or servient position. We do not ordinarily think
of one who is in such a state of subjectivity to another as having
a right against that other.
Can it be said that in every ease where one has the legal power
to extinguish his own right against another lie is under a legal
' Carey v. German American Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 80, 54 N. W. IS (1893);
Keith v. Royal Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 531, 94 N. W. 295 (1903).




duty not to exercise such power? For example, is one under a
duty not to give or sell his property to another because in so
doing he extinguishes his own rights with respect to it, or is he
under a duty not to assign his contractual rights since in so
doing he loses them, or under a duty not to waive his "rights"
or do acts constituting estoppel, since if he does so he loses
"rights?" We do not ordinarily think of any of these situations
as creating duties. Unless the conclusion is accepted that in all
of these cases the power to destroy one's own right sanctions a
duty, then a rule for distinguishing those cases that do from those
that do not must be devised. To be without such a rule would
make it impossible to know what is and what is not a duty. Is
there such a rule?
That confusion is likely to result is shown by another example
used by Professor Corbin. He says that a creditor is not under
a duty not to release his debtor.13 Why not? If he releases him
he loses his right against him. Why say that if a creditor
releases his surety, by extending time to the principal debtor,
he has violated a duty, but if he releases his principal debtor by
giving him a sealed release he has not violated a duty. In each
case C has exercised a power. In each case the effect of his act
is to destroy a valuable right in himself. The right given up in
the latter case is really more substantial than the one given up
in the former as it may be the only one the creditor has for com-
pelling payment of the debt. It may be contended that the
difference in the two cases lies in the fact that in the first, unless
the surety is held to be released, he may be harmed or prejudiced
by an extension of time to the principal debtor, whereas in the
other, no harm can result to the debtor if he is not released by
the instrument given to him by the creditor.14 But may not a
debtor be prejudiced by believing, contrary to fact, that he has
been discharged from his debt? Is he not injured if he is required
to pay a debt which the parties intended should be discharged?
But, however that may be, this reasoning is to put the cart before
the horse. It seems to the writer fundamental that whether
there is a legal duty in D not to do an act ought to be determined
not by the physical, economic or social harm resulting to C from
the act, but by the legal consequences of the act upon D. Whether
an act is a legal wrong depends upon the character of punishment
imposed by the law for doing it. 15 Even if these two cases are
13 "A creditor loses a valuable right when he releases his debtor but this
loss is not a societal penalty for doing a wrongful act." ibid. 522.
14 That injury to the surety is not the basis of the rule, however, see
SPENCER, SURETYSHIP (1913) 315.
15 In morals it may be said that the e.xistence of a duty in D depends upon
whether harm results to C, but in law resulting harm to C by the act or
omission of D does not determine the existence of a duty in D. The duty
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looked at from the moral point of view, it is hard to see that
there is anything more wrongful in a creditor's extending time
to his principal debtor than in his releasing the principal debtor
altogether. In substance both would seem to be acts of charity.
It is true also that there is a third party in one case and not in
the other, but that fact has no bearing whatever upon the
character or severity of the penalty the creditor brings down
upon himself. It would seem too, that the fact that C has the
intention to release his debtor in the second case, but has no such
intention in the other case can hardly be material to the question
of sanctions for a duty. If so it opens up another problem which
would make it difficult indeed to determine whether or not a
duty had been violated in a particular case.21 If there is reason
not to do an act exists, not because to do it will harm C, but because the
law will penalize D if he does it.
That a duty in D is not dependent upon his act or omission resulting in
physical, economic, or social harm to C is established by the cases recogniz-
ing the existence of a legal duty where no such harm results. Even though a
breach of contract by D results in no actual damage or harm to C, C may
recover nominal damages. See cases cited in 3 WILLISTON, CONTSGc1S
(1920) § 1340. Actual damage to the plaintiff is not an element in an
action for damages to realty. See Pfeiffer v. Grossman, 15 IM. 53 (1853),
where it was held there could be a recovery even though the defendant's
act was actually beneficial to the plaintiff.
On the other hand, that D may inflict unquestioned economic harm on
C without violating a legal duty see, Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171
N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902) ; Passaic Print Works v. Ely, 105 Fed. 1G3
(C. C. A. 8th, 1900).
2c If a tramp should commit an act of vagrancy with the object and in-
tention of obtaining the sleeping and eating accommodations of a jail for a
few days, he would nevertheless have violated a duty in doing that act.
That the legal detriment is intended, desired, or willed would not seem
to prevent the exstence of a duty.
It also seems true that the purpose or object of the state in imposing
a penalty is not influential in determining whether the act for which the
penalty is imposed is in violation of a duty. That question should be
sharply distinguished from the question of determining what act the state
has penalized. In the latter question, purpose is a material consideration.
E. g., due to the ambiguity of a statute or the obscurity of judicial decisions,
it may sometimes be difficult to say whether the law penalizes act X or
act Y. Suppose a statute requires that if a person sells intoxicating liquor
he shall pay a fee to the state. Does this law command that intodeating
liquor shall not be sold under penalty of paying a fine, or does it command
that if one sells liquor he shall pay a tax? In other words is one under
a duty not to sell intoxcating liquor or under a duty not to fail to pay a
tax if he does? To answer the question as to which act the state forbids,
it seems entirely proper to look into the purposes or object of the state in
enacting such a law. However, after it is once determined what particular
act is penalized, it is believed there can be no further object in looking
into the motives or purposes of the law-making power. Whether the law
creates a duty must then depend upon the character of the penalty im-
posed. If it is certain that the law penalizes the doing of a particular
act, purpose then becomes immaterial on the question of whether there is
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to say that there i§ a duty in one of these cases and not in the
other, to say the least, it is such as is likely to lead to confusion
and difficulty of application.
A further objection to the view that a creditor is under a
duty not to extend time to his principal debtor is that it throws
confusion into the law of conditions in contracts, a field in which
Professor Corbin has rendered invaluable analytical service.17
He has said that a condition in the law of contracts is a fact
subsequent to the making of an agreement and prior to its dis-
charge, which operates to create or extinguish legal relations. 10
Following this view, I should say that a creditor is not under a
duty to a surety not to give an extension of time to the principal
debtor, but that the creditor's not giving such extension is a
condition precedent to the surety's duty to pay, and that the
effect of the non-fulfillment of such condition is to prevent the
creation of an instant right-duty relation between the creditor
and the surety. Or it could be said that the extending of time
is a condition subsequent, operating to extinguish the antecedent
conditional right-duty relation between the creditor and the
surety. In either case, after all the facts have happened the
creditor has no right against the surety. This argument is anti-
cipated by Professor Corbin, and is answered in a note by his
saying that this is not a condition because, "such is not the
language of the parties or their actual intention." 10 But no
one has a better reply to this answer than Professor Corbin
himself, who on another occasion in speaking of conditions, said:
"a fact will operate as a condition when the court believes that
justice requires it even tho the parties neither had nor expressed
any intention regarding it." 20 This is a good example of a fact
a legal duty. Presumably, the law purposes what it accomplishes. To
the extent that it does not, purpose is unimportant.
Furthermore, the frequent ambiguity of the law's purposes deprives that
element of any practical utility in determining the existence or nonexistence
of a duty. Suppose C, after having been erroneously advised by his attor-
ney that a written release given for less than the full debt is ineffectual,
delivers a release in full to D in order to obtain a part payment of the
debt, who can say that the purpose of the law in preventing the creditor
from recovering the rest of the debt is not to punish the creditor? Whether
or not that is the purpose, it is the result.
'2 Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract (1919) 28 YAr LAw Joun-
NAL 739; ANSON, CONTRACTS (Corbin's ed., 1919) §§ 355-372.
18 ANSON, op. cit. supra note 17, § 356. To the same effect see COSTIGAN,
THE PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1927) 5.
19 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 10, at 520, n. 24.
20 CORBIN, CASES ON CONTRACTS (1921) 478. At another place the state-
ment is made that a fact will operate as a condition "because the court
believes that by reason of the mores of the time, justice requires that it
should so operate." ANSON, op. cit. supra note 17, § 357. See also 2 WIL-
LISTON, op. cit. supra note 15, § 825; COSTIGAN, op. Cit. supra note 18, at 8;
Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897) 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 466.
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held to be a condition because of the belief that justice requires
it. There are too many cases recognizing constructive conditions
for it now to be said that expressed or implied intention is
determinative of whether or not there is a condition. As to
whether there is a constructive condition must be determined by
considerations of justice and the mores of the time. Professor
Corbin has not said that since C may lose a right by the non-
fulfillment of a condition he is therefore under a duty to fulfill
the condition. He simply says that the creditor's not e:tending
the time of the principal debtor is not a condition, but that since
C loses his right by such extension he is under a duty not to
extend time. But if this view is accepted, what is to be the test
for determining whether the facts of a particular situation
operate to create a condition or a duty? If a breach of some
duties is to have the same legal effect as the non-fulfillment of
a condition, how are we to distinguish a broken condition from a
violated duty? It is submitted that with the acceptance of Pro-
fessor Corbin's view that a creditor is under a duty not to extend
time to his principal debtor the test for determining what is and
what is not a constructive condition vanishes.2
Decisions of courts do not aid in an answer to this question,
for they have not attempted to distinguish what is and what is
not a condition along that line.
Much of the criticism set forth above applies with equal force
to Professor Corbin's statement that a depositor is under a duty
to examine his returned checks and notify the bank in case he
detects forgery because if he does not notify the bank he loses
his right to recover the amount of the forged checks from the
bank, and likewise to the statement that a minor child is under
a duty to obey its parent because the parent is privileged to
spank. The argument in the latter case apparently is that if the
child disobeys it loses its right that the parent shall not assault.2
The threat of the loss of this beneficial relation, it is said, creates
a duty in the child. -
Professor Corbin says that if the only rule against homicide
21 In some installment contract cases it has been held that where the
plaintiff has failed to include in his action all installments due at the time
of action, he thereby loses his right to the omitted installments. Here is a
ease in which the plaintiff has acquired an unconditional present right which
is extinguished by his failure to ask for its enforcement in another suit.
Has he violated a duty, or is this an illustration of a condition subsequent?
See Beecher v. Conradt, 13 N. Y. 108 (1855). That it is a condition sub-
sequent see COSTIGAN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 20.
22 Although the common law recognizes no civil duty in the father not
to assault his child, the father is amenable to the criminal law if he pun-
ishes unreasonably. See TIFFANY, PEsoNs AND DO=ESTIC RELLTIONS (2d
ed. 1909) 264.
23 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 10, at 520, 521.
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is that B shall be outlaw if he kills A, and anyone (X) is
privileged to kill B and to seize his goods, then it is proper to say
that B is under a duty not to kill. But it is believed that if this
is so it is only because X by such rule has become the agent of the
state. Professor Corbin seems to be of the opinion that even
though X is not the state's agent, B is under a duty, for he says
that "the fact that a rule provided that the sheriff and other
peace officers will not act against X for killing B, operates as a
heavy penalty and a preventive." 24 That is to say, B is punished
for his act of killing A by being deprived of his rights that X
shall not take his goods or his life. In their stead are no-rights,
and X has privileges to take B's goods or his life. The state
threatens B thus: "If you kill A you will be penalized by having
no claims against X for taking your property or your life." But
suppose B does an act operating to give X a privilege to walk
across B's land, the sheriff and other officers will not act against
X if he walks across. B has no right that X shall not walk
across. The threat of the state to B here, likewise, is: "If you
give X permission to walk across your land you will be penalized
by having no claims against X for taking such privilege." But is
that a sufficient penalty to justify the statement that B is under
a duty not to give X the privilege to walk across?
In view of the above considerations it is believed the term
"duty" should not be used to describe that relation sanctioned
merely by the penalty of the loss of one or more rights.
II. Supposing that the threat of X is that if D does or forbears
to do an act, X will refuse to recognize another act of D as auto-
matically acquiring for him beneficial legal relations, is D under
a duty to forbear or do the former act? If the law regards an act
of D as rendering him incapable of acquiring beneficial legal
relations he is being penalized for the act. If D conveys Black-
acre to C, D cannot ordinarily reacquire title to it without C's
consent. Neither will his deed be operative to convey it to B.
Here is a disability, a form of punishment or restraint of liberty
that the law places on D for selling Blackacre. Who would say
that D is under a duty not to convey Blackacre to C because of
the imminence of this disability? If C's offer to D is revoked or
lapses, D's power of acceptance is extinguished and his act of
acceptance is inoperative. It will not result in D's acquiring a
right under the contract. It is a nullity, and a penalty imposed
by the law for a late acceptance. It hardly accords with usage
to say that because of the threat of such a penalty, D is under a
duty to accept C's offer. It has not been seriously contended that
such a penalty sanctions a duty.
III. Supposing that the threat of X is tMat if D does or for-
24 Ibid. 519.
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bears to do a;n act, X vill refuse to recognize an act of C, or
another event, as automatically creating in. D beneficial legal
relations, is D under a duty to forbear or do such act? If one is
rendered immune from the receipt of a legal advantage from
another, he is caused to suffer a penalty. This is what may be
called a detrimental immunity. If D witnesses a will in which
he is a devisee, the devise, in most states, is void.2" D's act of
witnessing the will renders him immune from the acquisition of
the benefits of the devise. This is a penalty for his attesting the
will. But it is believed that D is not under a duty not to attest
the will. No one except a native born or naturalized citizen of
the United States may hold federal office. This means that one
who is not a citizen has a detrimental immunity from the receipt
of the "emoluments" of federal office. We speak of this usually
as an incapacity or disability of the alien, but more accurately it
is an incapacity or disability of the electors to present him with
the office. This is a penalty for his failure to become
naturalized. -6 Yet it hardly accords with usage to say that,
because of the existence of this penalty, an alien is under a duty
to become a citizen. Before equity nullified the common law
rule, a woman who married became immune from the acquisition
of "title" to personal property by the act of another. Correla-
tively, her father, or any other person, had a disability to create
"title" in her. This was detrimental to her and was a penalty
for marrying, but was she under a duty not to marry? 27 Here,
also, it is believed that usage does not justify the view that a
penalty of this character sanctions a legal duty.
IV. Supposing that the threat of X is that if D does or for-
bears to do an act, X will recognize an act of C, or another event,
as autom aticolly depriving D of a beneficial legal relation, is D
under a duty to forbear or do such act? Here D is threatened
with a liability to legal disadvantages. The power of punishment
is placed in the hands of C. If D gives C an option on Blackacre,
2 See, e. g., Ill. Rev. Stat. (Smith, 1921) 148, § 8.
26 Of course the alien has a disability to acquire the office by his onn act,
but this is to be distinguished from his immunity from receipt of the office
by the act of others. In the first case he has the disability and the electors
the immunity. In the second case the electors have the disability and he
has the immunity. Even a citizen has a disability to acquire the office
by his own act, but he is not immune from receiving it at the hands of the
electorate.
The "qualification" that the President of the United States shall be a
native born citizen is really a detrimental immunity. The electors have a
disability to elect and the alien is inmmune from the legal advantages of
the office. This is not a form of punishment however, since the result is
brought about through no act or omission of the alien. It is similar to
one's immunity from acquisition of property by inheritance from one who
is not his relative. See supra note 8.
2 7 PECK, PERSONS A' D DOMESTM RELATIONS (2d ed. 1920) § 69.
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C by his act of acceptance can deprive D of those relations
constituting "equitable title" to Blackacre. If a fire insurance
policy provides that C may "forfeit" D's policy if the insured
dwelling "becomes and remains vacant for more than ten days,"
and D violates such provision, his rights under the policy are in
the hands of C.21 In each of these cases C may do an act that
will automatically deprive D of one or more beneficial legal rela-
tions. In such event D would be penalized by the act of C
without the intercession of an agent of the state. Does the
threat of the creation of this liability for doing an act place D
under a duty not to do such an act? Here again it is believed
it does not.29 But Professor Corbin, in the article referred to
above, says that a father owes a duty of support to his child
because if he does not support it he comes under a liability to a
duty to a third party who might furnish such child with neces-
saries.30 The analysis of the case seems to be this. Prior to
non-support on the part of the father he has an immunity from a
duty to pay a third party who might furnish his child with
necessaries, but his non-support deprives him of such immunity
and substitutes therefor a liability. This penalty, says Professor
Corbin, sanctions a duty in the father to the child.
But it is believed that if the relation of a father toward his
child 'vith respect to support is called a duty, inconsistency or
absurdity in the use of the term is almost certain to result. For
example, it would follow that one is under a duty not to make an
offer to contract, for if he does he comes under a liability to a
contractual duty.31 Prior to his offer he has an immunity from
a contractual duty, but his making an offer deprives him of such
immunity and substitutes therefor a liability. Why is not this a
penalty sanctioning a duty not to make an offer? The law says
28 Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kuhlman, 58 Neb. 488, 78 N. W. 936 (1899).
29 It might be said one who owns a dog is under a liability to a duty to C,
the duty being created when the dog bites C. Here is a threat of the law
to D for owning the dog. Does that threat create a duty not to own the
dog? Neither Hohfeld nor Corbin would call this a "liability" but, instead,
a "conditional duty." The objection to calling it a liability is that it then
becomes necessary to recognize a dog as having a power and the biting by
the dog as an exercise of power. Although it is fundamental to Hohfeld's
system to regard rights, duties, privileges and no-rights as personal, it is
not fundamental to regard powers, liabilities, disabilities and immunities
as personal. It is suggested that it might prove convenient in many cases
to recognize nature, animals and things as having powers, and persons as
being liable to a change in relations by exercise of them. See Green, Tih
Relativity of Legal Relations (1923) 5 ILL. L. Q. 187.
30 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 10, at 521.
31 That an offer creates a power of acceptance in the offeree, and a cor-
relative liability in the offeror, see Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Somo
of the Resulting Legal Relations (1917) 26 YALE LAw JOURNAL 169; 1
WILLISTON, op. cit. supra notq 15, at 31.
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to him: "If you make an offer you will be penalized and the
penalty will consist, not merely in your inability to acquire some-
thing valuable from another (which Professor Corbin says does
not create a duty), but in depriving you of your pre-existing
beneficial immunity to contractual relations, and creating in its
stead a detrimental liability to such contractual relations." It
is true that the liability of a father created by the non-support
of his child is owed to a third party, but being under a liability
is a penalty whether it is owed to a second party or a third party.
The important point is that in both cases one has done an act
resulting in his being placed under a liability. But that the
third party element has no potency may be shown by the follow-
ing case. If D's offer to T is, "Deliver goods to C and I will pay
for them," D is placed under a liability to T, and if T delivers
goods to C, D is under a duty to T to pay for them. Does it
follow that D is under a duty to C not to make such an offer?
Yet, if a father owes his minor child a duty of support because
of the threat of a liability to a third person, it would seem that
consistency would require it to be said that D owes C a duty not
to make the above offer because of the threat of a liability
running to T.
But it may be asked, what is objectionable in saying that one
is under a duty not to make an offer to contract. The answer
is, that it has never been done. It would likewise result in
confusion and would deprive the word of much of its utility as a
tool for expressing a definite idea.
Professor Corbin puts the question: "Can B commit a breach
of duty to A by negligent conduct even tho A is not hurt at all?" -2
As hereinafter contended, the answer to this question, it seems to
me, ought to depend on whether A can get a judgment for
damages for the commission of such negligent act, or a decree
in equity restraining it. If he can do neither, there is no duty.
If he can, there is. But Professor Corbin is of the opinion that
there may be such a duty even though neither an action at law
nor a suit in equity may be maintained. The penalty back of
such duty, he says, is the "conditional duty" to pay the loss if
it occurs. This is a detrimental relation, to be sure, but if it is
sufficient to sanction a duty, here again we are tempted to
say that the "conditional duty," or liability, of one who makes
an offer to contract also sanctions a duty, and one is, therefore,
under a duty not to make an offer.3 3 The same risk of the incur-
32 Corbin, op. cit. supra note 10, at 524 et seq.
33 "Conditional duty" describes the same situation as a 'liability to a
duty," except that, in the former, the event that may extinguish the con-
ditional duty and create the instant duty is an impersonal event, whereas,
in the latter, the event that will extinguish the liability and create an
instant duty is an act of a person in whom the correlative power residcs.
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rence of a duty exists in either case. In one case a bullet is shot
into the air which may result in creating a duty in B. In the
other, certain words are spoken into the air which may result in
creating a duty in B. Of course there may be a difference in the
severity of the penalty, but that would be only a matter of degree.
There may also be moral disapprobation attached to the firing
of the gun that would not attach to the making of an offer. But
moral disapprobation does not determine the existence of a legal
duty. To say the threat of a detrimental liability creates a duty
can but lead to confusion and inconsistency.
V. Supposing that the threat of X is that if D does or forbears
to do an act, X will intercede for C to deprive D of beneficial
legal relations, is D under a duty to forbear or do such act?
"Duty" is the only tern that seems adequate to describe this
relation. The state says to D: "If you commit an assault and
battery upon C, C may affirmatively proceed against you in court,
obtain a judgment against you and cause your property to be
levied upon and sold." The effect of such procedure is to deprive
D of his advantageous legal relations with respect to such
property. D may do or threaten an act that will entitle C to an
injunction against D, thereby depriving D of certain advantages
with respect to his property, such as the privilege to use his
building for a slaughter house.' If D commits what the law
calls a crime C may cause the proper agents of the state to pro-
ceed against D and by imprisonment deprive him of his privilege
of personal freedom, or by hanging deprive him of all the rights,
privileges, powers and immunities that constitute his legal life.
In such cases the law enables one person to call upon the state's
agents, whether they be judge, sheriff, board, or other officials,
for the purpose of depriving another person of his legal benefits.
The uniqueness of this type of punishment is that C may affirma-
tively require an agent of the state to inflict harm upon D. But
it is important to note that in the ordinary civil case, the detri-
mental result immediately threatened by the state is not the
judgment, execution and sale of D's property, but the secondary
or remedial duty.- That is, the state does not say to D, "If
The helplessness or subjectivety of the bearer of the relation is the same
in either case, and one is just as much a penalty as the other.
34 In some cases, however, it seems that a breach of a primary duty does
not result in the creation of a secondary duty. For example, if D murdera
C, D has violated a primary duty, but there is no act that he has a secon-
dary duty to perform. The state simply punishes him for having murdered
C, and D has no power to stay or prevent the penalty. Likewise, if a hus-
band does an act that will give his wife a right to a divorce, he has no
secondary duty to do any act. He does not have the power to give his
wife a divorce. He is, however, under a primary duty not to do the act
giving cause for divorce, because if he does, the state's officers can be called
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you assault C your act will automatically result in your being
relieved of your property," but the state does say, "If you assault
C your act will automatically result in your being placed under
a secondary or remedial duty to pay damages." The immediate
thr eat is the imposition of the remedial duty, and the threat for
not performing the remedial duty is judgment, execution, and the
sale of D's property. It seems proper, however, to say that this
entire series of acts following the original forbidden act is the
description of the penalty threatened by the law for doing such
forbidden act. Doing the act that is penalized starts a train of
detrimental events, one following in the wake of the other, finally
resulting in D's being deprived of a group of beneficial legal
relations in his property or person. 3 Before doing such act D
had a privilege not to pay damages. His doing the forbidden act
operated to deprive him of such privilege and to substitute there-
for the remedial duty to pay damages. This harm sanctions a
legal duty.
Coriwlsion. Five legal penalties have been set out above. In
many situations there will be found a combination of two or
more of them, but our inquiry is, Does the imminency of each
one separately create a primary legal duty? -0 An attempt has
been made to show that to apply the term "duty" to the threat
of any of the first four penalties leads to absurdities or incon-
upon to deprive him of his marital "rights." The absence of a secondary
duty seems to be limited to cases of a criminal and quasi-criminal nature.
35 "But generally in modern law the remedial right is not considered as
the product but as the expression of the antecedent right." DEL VEccmo,
THE FORIAL BASES OF LAW (1914) 18, n. 11.
"Remedial or sanctioning rights are merely part of the machinery pro-
vided by the state for the redress of injury done to antecedent rights."
HOLLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 148.
There are numerous steps in the procedure provided by law for enabling
C to procure a judgment against D. These steps involve various powers and
liabilities between C and D, and between each party and the court. How-
ever, it is believed that an analysis of this relationship is unnecesary in
determining the substantive relations of the parties. Such relations are
determined by facts existing prior to the commencement of an action.
Those are the facts that form the basis for a prediction as to what a court
will do. If it is desired to carry the analysis into the procedural field, it
might be said that the effect of a breach of duty is the creation of a power
in C to confer upon a court the power to render a judgment against D.
C exercises such power by instituting a proper action and presenting his
evidence. Correlative to such power in C is a liability in the court until
the action is filed and evidence presented. Then the court has the power
to render, and D is under a correlative liability to the rendition of an
adverse judgment.
26 It should be kept clearly in mind that our present inquiry is not
whether each of these penalties has a sanction, but whether each of these
penalties sanctions a duty. The writer believes, however, that each of
these five penalties has a sanction, for otherwise they would not be penal-
ties.
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sistencies. Furthermore, the terms "no-right," "disability,"
"detrimental immunity," and "detrimental liability" seem to be
adequate verbal tools for describing those penalties.,, But to
describe the fifth penalty, "duty" is most convenient if not
necessary. Why use "duty" for any of the first four situations
when it is not needed? Why not reserve it for a single use, and
thereby eliminate possible confusion and promote nicety and
precision of expression?
As suggested at the outset, the answer to our inquiry, as to
the scope of "duty," should depend upon what, in view of the best
usage and consistency, is most convenient.As It is believed that
the simplest and most convenient connotation that may be given
to the term, and one substantially in accord with the best usage,
is that D is under a duty to C to act or forbear when, if D does
not so act or forbear, C may procure a judgment, decree, order
or similar act of a court, board, official or other agent of the
state, compelling D either to do the act or forbearance, or to
suffer the deprivation of beneficial legal relations for not so
acting or forbearing.3 9 If such act or forbearance creates in
37 Of course these terms do not describe a threat existing before the act
creating them occurs. They describe the situation after the law's threat has
been executed. A term to describe the antecedent relationship seems un-
necessary. The whole situation can be adequately described by statipg the
consequences of the act. E. g., if D does act Y he will be under a disability.
For a classification of duties into perfect, or those enforceable by suit,
and imperfect, or those sanctioned by some other form of coercion, see
TmaRY, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 140 and 141, and also SALMiOND, op. cit. supra
note 2, § 78. If there is a sufficiently pressing need of a term to describe the
threat of these milder forms of penalty, we might borrow from Terry and
Salmond their term "imperfect duty" even though it was used by them in
a somewhat different sense.
38 It may be said that whether there is a punishment for a particular act
depends upon how the advantages accruing from such act balance up
against the disadvantages resulting from the act. E. g., if D sells 0 prop-
erty he loses his beneficial relations with respect to it but acquires benefi-
cial relations with respect to the purchase money which offset his disad-
vantages. But it hardly seems that such is relevant to the issue for two
reasons. (1) To determine whether there is a duty in a particular case
would involve the delicate weighing of advantages and disadvantages, and
(2) in every case, in theory, advantages balance disadvantages in the end.
An advantage has been gained by one. The law requires compensation for
it. It has various ways for requiring such compensation. The very matter
we are discussing is how compensation shall be rendered, how advantages
and disadvantages shall be equalized. If the law imposes a detriment upon
one for the benefit of another in any case, it is usually upon the theory
that it is owing. See HOLLAND, op. cit. supra note 2, at 326.
39 A definition of an act or omission is not here attempted. An act or
omission is however an element of "duty." Unless one has in some way
acted or failed to act, he has not violated a duty. There may be, however,
a judicial proceeding not based upon an act or omission of a person. In
-such cases a breach of duty is not involved. E. g., in a suit to dissolve a
partnership because of the death or insanity of a partner there has been
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him merely a no-right, disability, detrimental liability or detri-
mental immunity, he is not under a duty, but has a privilege to
do or fo- -ear doing such act. This view would enable us to
determine whether an act or omission violates a duty by answer-
ing the question, Will an action lie? If it will there is a duty
in the defendant. If it will not there is a privilege in the defend-
ant.-0 Suppose a surety should sue a creditor alleging damages
because the creditor had extended the time of the principal
debtor. Judgment would go for the defendant. It seems con-
venient to say that such a judgment means that the creditor is
not under a duty not to extend time to the principal debtor. By
the application of this test the result would be reached that there
is no duty in each of the other cases stated at the beginning of
this article.
The solution of legal problems depends fundamentally upon
the answer to two questions, (1) Can C act against D without
the aid of a state agent? (2) Can C act against D with the aid
of a state agent? Power, liability, disability and immunity are
the verbal tools provided for answering the first question. Right,
duty, privilege and no-right ought to be the tools for answering
the second question.
By way of summary, the argument of this paper may be stated
as follows:
no breach of duty. Neither dying nor going insane is an act. Therefore no
act has been done in violation of a duty. See HOLLUxD, op. cit. supra note
2, at 108; Cook, Act, Intention, Motive (1917) 26 YA= LAW JoURNAL M45.
40 The impression is not intended to be left that all difficulties disappear
if the suggested connotation of duty is used. But it is believed that they
would be reduced to a minimum. If an action is brought in the wrong
court, or if it is brought in a court when it should properly come before
an administrative board or other official, judgment will be entered for the
defendant. Does this determine that the defendant is not under a duty?
So far as the jurisdiction of such a court is concerned it is probably cor-
rect to say that the defendant is under no duty to the plaintiff, but if there
is another court, administrative body, or official that may compel the de-
fendant to act according to the law of the land, it would seem that he is
under a duty to the other party. E. g., if in a state having a worhmcn's
compensation act, an action is brought in a court of general jurisdiction for
an injury sustained in the course of and growing out of employment, the court
will render judgment for the defendant. In that court the defendant has
a privilege instead of a duty, but since a workmen's compensation board
-would render an award for the plaintiff, the law of the Etate is that the
defendant is under a duty to the plaintiff. Difficulties of application might
arise in cases where a party does not allege or introduce evidence of all the
operative facts, or where, through the negligence or incompetency of his
attorney, advantage is not taken of rules of practice or procedure, or where
an appeal is improperly prosecuted, or where, though an action lies, it is
doubtful whether it is based on an act or omission of the defendant, C. g.,
a proceeding to construe a will. But the purpose of this article does not
require a solution to these problems.
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1. The existence of a duty in D to do or not to do an act is
not dependent upon a resulting physical, economic or social
injury to C.
2. The existence of a duty in D to do or not to do an act is
dependent upon a resulting imposition by the state of a penalty
upon D.
3. As a result of an act or omission of D the state may punish
him either (a) by preventing him from acquiring beneficial legal
relations or (b) by depriving him of beneficial legal relations.
The state may accomplish the former by imposing either (1)
a no-right, (2) a disability or (3) a detrimental immunity. It
may accomplish the latter (4) by the imposition of a detrimental
liability, or (5), in response to the demand of C, by an adverse
executive or judicial order, judgment decree, or similar act.
4. It is not convenient to regard any o'f the first four penalties
as sanctioning a duty, because to do so would require a test diffi-
cult of application, and almost certain to produce inconsistent
or absurd results.
5. It is most convenient to regard only the fifth penalty, viz.,
an adverse executive or judicial act in response to C's demand, as
sanctioning a duty. When the scope of "duty" is thus limited,
it becomes a term of certainty and precision, and a useful tool
for clear and accurate expression.
41
41 Professor Corbin is quite right when he says that no criterion for de-
termining what is and what is not a duty is a necessary one, "all others
being 'untrue' ." All that is attempted or intended in this paper is the sub-
mission of an alternative test to that proposed by Professor Corbin, with
some reasons why it is thought to be more convenient.
